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    Abstract:
    We examine the implications of a North-South trade accord where investments
in the Southern partner nation exhibit country risk. Our analysis demonstrates
that North-South trade accords can serve as credibility-enhancing mechanisms
that induce additional foreign capital inflows into Southern partner nations. We
also demonstrate that the presence of sovereign risk changes the tradeoffs
between trade creation and diversion, enhancing the potential for regional trade
accords to increase the welfare of accord members. However, sovereign risk also
introduces a novel channel through which non-partner Southern nations can have
their welfare reduced by regional trade accords.
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    The recent debate concerning the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
in both policy circles and the popular press suggested that the primary impact
of the regional trade accord would not be a small reduction in already low
tariffs among the NAFTA partners, but a fundamental change in the attractiveness
of Mexico as a location for investment, resulhng in large capital movements
between the Northern and Southern trading partners. This claim was popularized
by such opponents of NAFTA as Ross Perot, who claimed that NAFTA would create a
"large sucking sound" as capital flowed from North to South in response to the
trade accord. Indeed, there is some evidence that "financial diversion" has
taken place in response to North-South integration, in the case of  both
Portugal and Spain in the EEC and Mexico under NAFTA ( Primo Braga, 1993).
    Despite the consensus among policymakers that the impact of trade accords on
    capital movements is potentially important, this issue seems to have
received little attention in the professional literature on the welfare
implications of customs unions,1 which has centered on the tradeoff between
trade creation and trade diversion.2 We should note that this is true even of
more recent analyses of trade accords, which stress both strategic issues
(McLaren, 1993, Bagwell and Staiger, 1993) and the political-economic
implications of such accords (Grossman and Helpman, 1993). The reason for this
gap in the literature is probably historical. Prior to NAFTA, successful
regional trade areas tended to be between  Northern countries, as in the EEC and
the US-Canada free trade area. As the first major North-South free trade area,
the NAFTA raises issues which are not central to North-North trade accords.
_______________
    1See Lipsey (1960) and de Melo et al. (1993) for extensive early and more
recent surveys.
    2Notable exceptions include Miyagiwa and Young (1986), who explicitly
introduce factor mobility into their analysis of customs unions in a different
context, and Manchester and McKibbin (1994), who analyze the implications of an
ad hoc decrease in Mexico's risk premium as a result of the NAFTA accord.    The primary distinction in a North-South trade accord is likely to be that
in the Southern nation physical capital is scarce relative to its  Northern trade
partner. Consequently, the impact of the trade accord on the ability of the
Southern trading partner to attract capital may have welfare implications for
both Northern and Southern nations. In this paper, we extend the traditional
analysis of customs unions to allow for international capital movements. Our
results indicate that trade accords may affect the ability of Southern nations
to attract capital, and may divert capital among Southern nations. Moreover, the
welfare implications of North-South trade accords may differ from  the predict
minor third-country impacts of NAFTA when factor endowments are held constant
(Safadi and Yeats, 1993).
    There is some anecdotal evidence that Southern nations already understand
the potential of bilateral and multilateral treaties as a mechanism for
achieving greater international credibility. Mexico has explicitly committed
under the NAFTA accord to national treatment of foreign investments and has
codified numerous investment regime liberalizations towards its NAFTA partners,
even though it had already undergone a large reform program in 1989 ( Hufbauer
and Schott, 1992). Apparently, the reason for reconfirming these  liberalizations
under NAFTA was that tying Mexico's commitments to the trade accord provide an
explicit mechanism for penalizing violations against NAFTA country investors. In
fact, prior to the NAFTA accord, Hufbauer and Schott (1992) had predicted that
"Since regulations are more easily changed than laws, the United States and
Canada are likely to seek commitments from Mexico in the NAFTA to make
regulatory reform more permanent." Along similar lines, Chile offered to
unilaterally commit to some liberalizing policies under the Uruguay round of
GATT.3
_____________
3We thank Andres Velasco for providing this example.The ability to use trade accords as credibility-enhancing mechanisms may
therefore be an aspect of regional trade accords that is particularly important
in North-South agreements.4
    We introduce a model of a bilateral free trade accord between a Northern and
a Southern nation in which the Southern nation utilizes capital from the North
for production purposes. The model is one where the Southern nation faces a
standard timing-inconsistency problem concerning levels of taxation on foreign
investment. The Southern nation then commits to a given level of taxation of
foreign investment under the trade accord.  Without loss of generality, and
following actual trade accords, we assume that such commitment takes the form of
national treatment, that is, equal levels of taxation of all investments
irrespective of nationality of the investor.5 The model considers the
possibility of the Northern and Southern partner nations entering into a trade
accord in which the Northern partner commits to allowing exports from the
Southern partner to enter its nation tariff free, and the Southern partner
commits to taxing foreign investment at the same rate as it taxes domestic
investors. Violation of the accord by either member leads to a cessation of the
accord, and to the Northern partner levying the optimal tariff on all imports.6
    4Perroni and Whalley (1993) interpret the same liberalizations as
concessions to larger entities in return for insurance against trade wars. These
two interpretations do not necessarily conflict; if a mutually beneficial
agreement requires these liberalization "concessions," a Southern trade partner
may be unable to achieve the agreement in the absence of the greater commitment
capacity the accord brings in the context of our analysis below.
    5Under this assumption, the host countries do not discriminate among foreign
investors by their nationalities of origin. In practice, efforts to so
discriminate may be very costly or impossible.
    6The impact of sovereign risk on long-term relationships between
transnational corporations and their host nations  has been examined by Thomas
and Worrall (1994). Similar to the results below, they find that long-term gains
for both parties from trade between a corooration and its host country a
relationship to become self-enforcing and long-term.    In addition, we consider the implications of the accord for a third, non-
partner Southern nation. This third nation also relies on foreign investment and
faces a timing-inconsistency problem concerning the rate of taxation on foreign
investment. One could interpret the third nation as representing the rest of the
South, or exporting nations not included in the trade accord.
    The model demonstrates that the standard analysis of trade-diverting trade
accords must be adjusted to account for changes in the risk characteristics of
the trading partners. In particular, our results demonstrate that the trade
accord can be increase the capacity of the Southern partner to accommodate
foreign investment under compliance with national treatment. This leads to
increased capital inflows into the Southern nation, and increases its gains from
the regional trade accord. However, this novel channel also impacts the non-
partner Southern nation. In addition to the standard terms of trade decline that
this nation suffers by being left out of the accord, it now experiences the
added burden of an increased credibility problem.
    The remainder of this paper is divided into six sections. Section 2  derives
the optimal tariff charged by the Northern partner nation in the presence and
absence of the trade accord. Section 3 then derives the capital constraints
faced by Southern partner and non-partner nations due to their credibility
problem. Section 4 derives the equilibrium output levels in the model. Section 5
then examines the net impact of the trade accord on output, prices, and welfare.
Section 6 analyzes the case in which local tax rates are set to maximize foreign
revenues. Section 7 concludes.
  II. Optimal Tariff in the Northern Partner Nation and the World Price of
      Southern Exports
    The model is a repeated game. There are two Southern nations. We  distinguish
values for the non-partner nation by hats. For example, each Southern nation has
                                              ^
a domestic sector with exogenous output s and s for the Southern partner and
non-partner nation, respectively. In addition, each has a foreign sector in
                                                                         ^
which output is a function of the magnitude of foreign investment, K and K. Let
      ^                                                                       ^
f and f represent the outputs of the foreign sectors,  f=f(K), f'>O, f"<O, and f
 ^  ^   ^      ^
=f (K), f'>O, f"£O. Let x and x represent total output of the Southern nations,
                 ^ ^ ^
where x=s+f, and x=s+f, all of which is exported to the North.
                                                                             ^
    Each period has three stages. In the first stage, investors choose K and K.
In the second stage under the trade accord, the  Northern partner nation chooses
whether to comply with the terms of the trade accord. If it chooses compliance,
it levies its optimal tariff t on all nations other than the Southern partner
nation, whose exports are allowed to enter tariff-free. If it chooses to violate
the trade accord (or if no trade accord exists), it levies its optimal tariff on
all nations. In the final stage, the Southern nations choose whether or not to
comply with their pledge of national treatment.
    Let z represent the imports of the Northern partner nation. The output and    imports of the rest of the world are taken as exogenous. Define ~ as the
world price of the Southern exportable which satisfies:
              ^
    d = d(x + x - z) (1)
    where d'<0, and d"‡0.
    We assume that total Northern partner demand exceeds the output of the
Southern partner.7 The Northern partner then imports the total output of the
Southern partner, plus some additional amount from the rest of the world. Define
P as the equilibrium price of the Southern export good under the trade accord,
given that the Northern partner nation levies its optimal tariff T on non-
partner nation exports. Define D=D(z), D’<O, D”‡O, as the domestic price of the
Southern exportable within the Northern partner nation. Let D now denote the
corresponding equilibrium consumer price, inclusive of the tariff, to be enjoyed
by the Southern partner nation under the trade accord. We show in the appendix
that given the tariff decision by the Northern partner nation, P and D are
functions of Southern production levels x and x:
                              ^           ^
                      P = P(x,x), D = D(x,x)   (2)
                                                                           ^
where P'< 0 and D’ < 0 in both arguments and  |aP/ax| < |aP/ax| and |aD/ax| < |aD/ax|.
         ~
    Let y represent the value of any variable  y in the absence of the trade
                            ~
accord. For example, define P as the world price of the Southern export good
given the optimal tariff by the Northern partner nation in the absence of the
trade accord. We demonstrate in the appendix that in the absence of a trade
        ~     ~
accord, P and D are also doubles:
                      ~   ~    ^   ~    ~    ^
                      P = P (x,x), D = D (x,x) (3)
           ~    ~           ~   ~
    where  Px = P^x < 0 and Dx = D ^x < 0.
                                                           ^
    We also demonstrate that given total Southern output  x+x, in the presence of
the trade accord the Northern partner applies a lower optimal tariff  t, which
results in larger imports z. This result reflects the fact that under the accord
the Northern partner is already allowing goods from the Southern partner to
enter tariff free, which lowers the net price effect of contracting imports,
thus diluting its monopsony power.
______________
7The alternative is that the Northern partner nation imports only from the
Southern partner nation under the accord--a rather trivial case.    III. Capital Constraints Faced by the Southern Partner and by Non-Partner
         Nations
    In the absence of a trade accord, the decision concerning complying  with
national treatment of foreign investment faced by the Southern partner nation
would be identical in nature to that faced by the Southern non-partner nation.
However, the signing of the trade accord changes the nature of the Southern
partner decision. In what follows, we first analyze the standard case faced non-
partner nation and then focus on the novel case faced by the partner nation.
    3.1 Capital constraint faced by the non-partner nation
    We assume that the non-partner nation has made a pledge of national
treatment towards foreign investment, which constitutes taxing foreign output at
                                             ^            ^
the same rate that domestic output is taxed, t. We treat t as exogenous here,
                                        ^
considering the extension to endogenous t below.
    If the non-partner nation chooses noncompliance, it fully taxes the output
of the foreign sector during this period. However, following  Bulow and Rogoff
(1989a), we assume that this nation suffers the penalty of losing a portion of
                              ^                                ^
the proceeds of its output (1-l) from that period onwards (O < l < 1). Moreover,
it receives no additional foreign capital inflows, so that its total output is
^      ^
s. Let b represent one minus the non-partner nation's rate of discount. Let  x
n
and P
n represent, respectively, the output of the partner nation and the
resulting world price level under noncompliance by the non-partner nation, and
    ^
let V
n
t +1 represent the value function of the non-partner nation under
                                      ^
incompliance beginning in period t+l. Vt
n+1 satisfies:
    ^      ^  ^




                                                                        ~
    Equation (4) is also valid in the absence of the trade accord with P
substituted for P. The non-partner nation's value function in period  t when
choosing noncompliance then satisfies:
    ^     ^   ^^  ^
    V
n
t = Px + blP
ns/(1-b).  (5)
    Under compliance, the non-partner nation enters the following period with
                                                                           ^
the choice of either maintaining compliance or choosing noncompliance. Let  V
c
t
                                                           ^
represent the value function under compliance in period  t. V
c
t satisfies:
    ^       ^   ^^   ^    ^     ^
    V
c





                ^
    Notice that Kt is constrained by the risk of violation of national treatment
                  ^   ^                    ^




t is decreasing in Kt. In equilibrium, investors choose
^            ^    ^                   ^




t in every period. V
c
t then satisfies:    ^      ^    ^^    ^
    V
c
t = P(s + tf)/(1-b) (7)
                                ^   ^                             ^




t is binding, by (5) and (7) K satisfies:
      ^^    ^ ^   ^    ^^  ^      ^
    P[bs + (t+b-l)f] - blP
n
s = 0 ” ￿           (8)
    Equation (8) places some parameter constraints on the possible values of  the
exogenous parameters. First, a sufficient but not necessary condition for a
                   ^ ^                ^                    ^
finite solution is t+b<l. Second, for K>O, we require that l<P/P
n. Notice that
                  ^             ^
this implies that l<l, since if l=1, then P=P
n In other words, like in Bulow and
Rogoff (1989b), direct penalties in the case of noncompliance are required to
support foreign investment.
    3.2. Capital constraint faced by the partner nation
    We assume that the partner nation has also made a pledge of national
treatment toward foreign investment, which corresponds to a pledge to tax
foreign output at the same rate that domestic output is taxed,  t. Again, we
initially treat t as exogenous.
    In the absence of a trade accord, the decision faced by the partner  nation
would be identical to that faced by the non-partner nation above. If the partner
nation chooses noncompliance, it fully taxes the output of the foreign sector in
the current period. However, beginning with the following period it suffers the
penalty of losing a portion of the proceeds of its output (I - l), where O < l <
1, and receives no additional foreign capital inflows. In addition, if there is
a trade accord, we assume that the accord is disrupted and that the Southern
partner nation faces the Northern partner nation's optimal tariff.
    This exacerbates the noncompliance penalty faced by the Southern  partner
nation. Under the accord, the Southern partner earns the Northern partner's
domestic price D. Beginning one period after violating the trade accord,
however, the Southern partner faces the Northern partner's optimal tariff. Let  b
                                                                    ^
represent one minus the Southern partner's rate of discount and let  x
P and P
P
represent, respectively, the output of the non-partner nation and the resulting
world price level under noncompliance by the partner nation. Let  V
p
t +1
represent the value function of the partner nation under noncompliance beginning
in period t+l. V
P
t+l satisfies:
                                     ~
V
p
t + 1 = lP
ps/(1-b)     (9)
    The value function of the Southern partner nation in period t under
noncompliance then satisfies:
                                     ~
V
p
t = Dx + blP
Ps/(1-b).     (10)
    Under compliance, the partner nation enters the following period with thechoice of either maintaining compliance or choosing noncompliance. Its value
function under compliance therefore satisfies:
V
c
t = D(s + tf) + bmax(V
c
t + 1’
VPt + 1)    (11)
    In equilibrium, investors will choose K such that  V
c ‡ V






t = D(s + tf)/(1-b) (12)




tis binding, by (10) and (12) K satisfies:
      ~
D[bs – (1-b-t)f] -bslP
p = 0 ” L (13)
    As in the non-partner nation case, Kt is constrained by the risk of




t is decreasing in Kt.
The sufficient conditions for positive and finite K are similar to those for the
non-partner nation. First, a sufficient but not necessary condition for a finite
                                                                    ~
solution is t+b<l. Second, for a positive solution, we require  l<D/P
P. We again
adopt both of these restrictions.
    Note that unlike the rest of the South, the Southern partner can sustain
positive foreign investment even in the absence of the direct penalties for
noncompliance underlying the parameterl. We demonstrate below that the trade
accord leads to a price advantage to the Southern partner nation, which alone
would support national treatment for some positive level of foreign investment.8
The trade accord is an additional commitment mechanism which, to our knowledge,
has not been analyzed in the literature.
    IV. Equilibrium Output Levels
    In this section, we derive the equilibrium levels of foreign capital  inflows
and output of the two Southern nations. As indicated above, while neither nation
chooses noncompliance in equilibrium, the threat of noncompliance affects the
capital constraint faced by the two nations. Consequently, we first find the
output equilibria where one of the two nations is in noncompliance. We then find
the overall equilibrium output levels.
_______________
    8The assumption that there are additional penalties for noncompliance ( l<1)
is made to allow for positive foreign investment in the absence of the trade
accord and in the rest of the South. The assumption not only adds realism, but
also allows us to study the effect of the trade accord on foreign investment in
the rest of the South.     4.1 Equilibrium with the partner and non-partner nations in noncompliance
        ^
    Let ￿
P represent the capital constraint faced by the non-partner nation  when
the partner nation is in noncompliance. When the partner nation is in
                                                    ~          ^
noncompliance, K is constrained to equal 0, and P= P
P. By (8) ￿
P satisfies:
    ~  ^^    ^  ^   ^    ^^~ ^       ^
    P
p[bs + (t + b-1)f] - blP
nps = 0 ” ￿p (14)
where P
np represents the price that emerges when both Southern nations are in
               ^                       ^
noncompliance. x
P is then the value of x that satisfies (14). We solve for the
                                        ^
comparative statics of the solution for x
P in the appendix, which satisfy: 9
                              ^    ^ ^  ^  ^
xp = g(b, t, l) (15)
                                     +  +  -
    Let ￿
n represent the capital constraint faced by the partner nation when  the
partner nation is in noncompliance. Under the trade accord, when the non-partner
                            ^
nation is in noncompliance, K is constrained to equal 0, and  P=P
n. Let D
n
represent the domestic price within the Northern partner under noncompliance by
the non-partner Southern nation. By (13)  ￿
n satisfies:
                                            ~
D
n[bs – (1-b-t)f] - bslP
np = 0 ” ￿
n (16)
    xn is then the value of x which satisfies (16). Under the assumption that
t+b<l, we solve for the comparative statics of the solution for x
n in the
appendix. The comparative static solutions satisfy  x
n = g(b,t,l). (17)
                                                          + + -
    4.2 Equilibrium with both nations in compliance
    In this deterministic model, foreign investors limit capital inflows into
both nations so as to ensure that countries choose to comply with national
treatment ex-post.  Equations (8) and (13) then form the equilibrium equations
for our model. We solve for the comparative static solutions in the appendix.
    The comparative static results reveal an ambiguity introduced  by the
indirect effect of the change in the value function under noncompliance of the
non-partner Southern nation. For example, a decrease in  l implies that the
penalty suffered under default by the partner nation is enhanced. Holding K
constant, the direct effect of this decrease is a reduction in the value
function of the Southern partner nation under compliance, and hence an increase
in the magnitude of K that can be supported without inducing noncompliance.
 ____________
               ^
 9 Since s and s also enter into the determination of the world price, the
   comparative static results for these parameters are  ambiguous.k However, by (17) a decrease in l also implies an increase in x
n, the output of
the Southern partner nation given noncompliance by the non-partner nation.
This increase reduces the value function of the non-partner nation under
                                                                   ^
noncompliance, and therefore induces a larger equilibrium level of K. The
            ^
increase in K then puts downward pressure on P, which would tend to reduce K.
For l to have a positive impact on K, this latter indirect effect must be
weaker than the initial direct effect. Similar constraints are needed to sign
                                                   ^  ^      ^
the comparative statics concerning changes in t,b, l, t, and b. These are shown
in the appendix. Under these constraints, the comparative static results for K
    ^
and K yield:
                                         ^  ^  ^
K = K(l, t, b, l, t, b)(18a)
                                -  +  +  +  -  -
                         ^   ^          ^  ^  ^
K = K(l, t, b, l, t, b)  (18b)
                               +  -  -  -  +  +
 4.3 Northern nation compliance
    We assume that if the Northern partner violates the trade accord, the
Southern partner responds in all future periods by acting as if the Northern
nation is going to levy the optimal tariff.l0 Let W
nc represent the welfare of
the Northern partner nation from violating the trade accord this period and
having no trade accord in future periods.
        ~
    Let W be the welfare level associated with no trade accord. Then:




o D(a)da - d
ncz
nc + pW   (19)
where p represents one minus the rate of discount of the Northern partner,  z
nc
                                                           ^
represents the imports of the Northern partner given x and x, but with the
Northern partner levying the optimal tariff on all nations. Similarly,  d
nc
represents the resulting market price in the first period when the Northern
partner fails to comply with the trade accord. Since the Northern partner nation
                                                                              ~
levies the optimal tariff in all future periods, the only difference between  W
and W
nc arises in the first period. Moreover, first-period welfare under
noncompliance will exceed that under the accord, since the Northern  partner
nation would be unconstrained.
_____________
    10Note that this "punishment" is a Nash equilibrium. If the Northern
      partner can violate the terms of the trade accord in one period without
      being punished, it can do it in all periods. Consequently, the optimal
      Southern partner response is to behave as if there were no trade
      accord. For the Northern partner to choose compliance, its expected welfare under the
trade accord, W, must be greater than or equal to its welfare under
noncompliance, W
nc. This condition boils down to requiring that the welfare gain
from the accord be enough to offset the one-period gain from noncompliance:
             ~                   ~                 ~~
W-W > [￿
znc




0 D(a)da - dz] > 0        (20)
 V. Impact of the Trade Accord
    In what follows we characterize the equilibrium and derive the implications
 the trade accord for the three parties involved.
    5.1 Output and Prices
        ~
    Let f represent the output of the foreign sector of the non-partner nation
                                                       ~
in the absence of the trade accord. By equation (13),  f satisfies:
    ~             ~      ~        ~
    P[bs - (l-b-t)f]- bslP
p = 0 ” ￿    (21)
    By equations (13) and (21)
                      ~              ~
    D[bs - (I-b-t)f] = P[bs - (l-b-t)f] (22)
                     ~                    ~
By equation (22), f> f if and only if D > P. In other words, an increase in the
price faced by exporters from the Southern partner nation is a necessary and
sufficient condition for the accord to increase output in the Southern partner
nation.            ^
                   ~
    Similarly, let f represent the output of the foreign sector of the non-
partner nation in the absence of the trade accord. By (8), the capital
constraint faced by the non-partner nation in the absence of a trade accord
satisfies:        ^               ^
    ~ ^^      ^ ^ ~   ^^~ ^       ~
    P[bs - (1-t-b)f] - blP
ns = 0 ” ￿ (23)           ^
                                                ^   ~                ~
    By equations (8) and (23), it follows that f < f if and only if P/P> P
n/P
n.
This restriction implies that the equilibrium decline in the world price under
the trade accord is larger than that which would emerge under noncompliance by
the non-partner nation. From the point of view of the rest of the South, when
the decline in price under noncompliance is smaller than the decline in price
under compliance, equilibrium output decreases.
    5.2 Welfare
    Since the trade accord is assumed to be voluntary, its existence requires
that it be welfare increasing to both the Northern and Southern partner nations
relative to not entering into the accord. In this section, we examine the
conditions under which the trade accord is  welfare-enhancing for the two partner
nations.    By (12) the difference between the value functions of the Southern partner
in the presence and absence of the trade accord satisfies:
       ~       ~           ~~
    V- V = [(D-P)s + t(Df-Pf)]/(1-b)  (24)
    Note that there are two channels through which the Southern partner can
benefit from the trade accord. The first channel is the increase in the terms of
                  ~
trade it faces (D>P), which raises the value of the domestic sector and the tax
revenues from the foreign sector, given K. This channel is the standard one
addressed in the welfare theory of customs unions. The second channel is the
increase in the level of capital the Southern partner nation can support under
                                      ~
compliance with national treatment (f>f ). Recall that the constraint on
investment in this model is assumed to be the risk of noncompliance with
national treatment, rather than the marginal product of capital. The potential
for additional capital inflows, or "financial creation," represents a novel
channel for the trade accord to enhance its welfare.
    For the Northern partner to voluntarily enter into the trade accord, the
                                                    ~                ~
accord must also increase its welfare. Therefore W-W>O, where W and W satisfy:
            z
       W = [￿ D(a)da - d(x+x-z)(z-x)-D(z)x]/(l-p).   (25)
            O
         ~               ^
    ~    z          ~ ~  ~ ~ ~
    W = [￿ D(a)da - d(x +x-z)z]/(l-p).               (26)
         0
    Comparing equations (25) and (26), we see the trade-off faced by the
Northern partner nation. For a given Southern output and  Northern partner
imports, the Northern partner nation loses tariff revenue from allowing the
Southern partner nation to enter tariff free. It follows that the loss in tariff
revenue must be made up by a sufficient increase in the  Northern partner's terms
of trade for that nation's overall welfare to increase.
    5.3 Net effects of the trade accord
    In equilibrium, the trade accord leads to higher output and foreign
                                             ~
investment in the Southern partner nation  f>f ). This conclusion emerges from
the equilibrium condition (23), which states that output grows if and only if
the perceived price grows, and the self-selection constraint (24). It is easily
verified that the Southern partner benefits from the accord if its output grows.
 Moreover, overall Southern output must grow as a result of any  equilibrium
accord. For example, suppose that there is no accord, such that Southern partner
                                          ^
                                    ~     ~
and non-partner output are equal to x and x, respectively. Let W represent the
welfare of the Northern partner in the absence of the trade accord if it chooses
to import z, its import level under the trade accord.  W satisfies:
                          ^
         z            ~   ~
    W = [￿ D(a)da - d(x + x -z)z]/(l - p) (27)
         0In the absence of the accord, the Northern partner nation is unconstrained in
                           ~                ~
its choice of import level z, implying that W‡W. Consequently, for the trade
accord to be welfare enhancing to the Northern partner nation, it must be the
                                                        ^                      ~
case that W‡W. By (25) and (27), this implies that d(x+x-z)(z-x) + D(z)x ‡ d (x
  ^
  ~
+ x -z)z. For an positive optimal tariff with respect to the Southern non-
                                                                            ^
                                    ^                          ^         ~   ~
partners under the accord, D(z)>d(x+x-z). Substituting, d(x +x-z) < d ( x + x -
z) is obtained and, therefore, total Southern output must increase with the
                   ^
          ^   ~    ~
accord (x+x > x + x ). As long as the Southern partner nation is not too much
more productive than the non-partner nation, this will also imply an increase in
foreign investment.
The expansion in output also implies an increase in  Northern partner imports
                                    ~
under the trade accord. Recall that z is increasing in the level of Southern
                        ^                                    ^
                ^   ~   ~                  ~     ^    ~  ~   ~
output.  Sincex+x > x + x, it follows that  z (x+x) > z (x + x ). We demonstrate
                                                      ~                     ~
in the appendix that given Southern output levels, z ‡z . It follows that z>z .
    The sources of welfare gains for the Northern partner nation under the  trade
accord are therefore similar to those in the traditional customs union
literature. The welfare gains are greater when the trade accord induces a larger
increase in the supply of the exportable  good, and hence a larger decrease in
its price.
    However, there are novel implications of the trade accord in the presence  of
sovereign risk. The accord increases the amount of capital inflows the Southern
partner nation can accommodate without choosing noncompliance with national
treatment. The sovereign risk effect thus provides an additional source of
welfare gains for the Northern partner nation. On the other hand, when the trade
accord deteriorates the terms of trade faced by the non-partner nation, it also
reduces the level of capital inflows that nation can accommodate under
compliance with national treatment. This effect of the sovereign risk channel
has the opposite impact on welfare of Northern partner. One might think of this
new channel as representing financial diversion, which takes place under the
trade accord in addition to the trade diversion discussed in the  traditional
literature.
    In addition, note that the Northern partner's welfare could potentially
increase from the trade accord even in the face of a terms of trade decline.
This surprising possibility would require Southern partner output to be very
price sensitive, so that a small terms of trade increase would lead to a large
Southern partner output response. In that case, the Northern partner, in the
absence of a trade accord, may find itself facing its own timing inconsistency
problem, a scenario under which the Northern partner would benefit fromcommitting to charging a lower tariff on the Southern partner (as opposed to its
time-consistent optimal tariff) in order to increase the level of output in that
nation. The trade accord may then also enhance the credibility of the  Northern
partner as a low tariff importer.
    We next turn to the welfare implications for the Southern non-partner
nation.
    By (7), the difference between the welfare function of the Southern non-
partner nation in the presence and absence of the trade accord satisfies:
        ^                        ^
    ^   ~       ^   ^^   ~ ^   ^ ~     ^
    V - V = [P(s + tf) - P(S + tf)]/(1-b)  (28)
        The net welfare impact on the non-partner nation depends on the change
in its terms of trade, as well as the change in the output of its foreign
                                             ^
                                          ^   ~                ~      ~
sector. As we demonstrate above in (23), f < f if and only if P /P > P
n/P
n. The
net impact of the accord on the welfare of the non-partner Southern nation is
therefore ambiguous.
    The more standard case would be that the above condition would be satisfied
and the trade accord would result in a world terms of trade decline. Under these
conditions, the decline in terms of trade would lead to financial diversion in
the sense that foreign investment would be diverted away from the non-partner
nation. In this case, the non-partner nation would have its welfare reduced by
the trade accord.
    However, there is another possibility. If the above condition is violated,
the non-partner nation may benef~t from the trade accord even if its terms of
trade are reduced. This surprising outcome requires that the trade accord have a
sufficient positive impact on the ability of the non-partner nation to support
foreign investment under compliance with national treatment to more than offset
the terms of trade decline. While unlikely, this ambiguity demonstrates the
power of sovereign risk considerations to alter our analysis of the welfare
implications of trade accords.
    VI. Endogenous Taxation Levels
    There are many potential determinants of a nation's tax rates. Nevertheless ,
the framework derived above is one in which the tax levied on domestic producers
has a direct impact on government revenues under compliance with national
treatment. In this section, we derive the revenue-maximizing level of domestic
t, and examine the implications of levying this revenue-maximizing  t on the
welfare implications of the trade accord.
    By (12), differentiating the value function of the Southern partner nation
with respect to t satisfies:
dV/dt = [(aK/at)f'(Dx(s +tf)+Df’t)+Df]/(1-b). (29)
    As we demonstrate in the appendix, aK/at > 0 as long as the direct effectsdominate (for example if the demand function D is moderately concave), which we
maintain as an assumption. Consequently, equation (29) implies that the value
function of the Southern partner nation is increasing in  t as long as it is
increasing in K. This will be the case as long as the price decline resulting
from increased Southern partner output is not too severe.
    Note the role that sovereign risk plays in generating this result. In
equilibrium, capital inflows are increased until the recipient country is
indifferent between complying and not complying with national treatment. This
assumes that when this point is reached and the risk of noncompliance with
national treatment becomes a binding constraint on capital inflows, the
corresponding economic return on foreign investment is large enough as to yield
an after-tax return on investment in excess of alternative home returns. Under
this premise, an increase in the tax rate raises the magnitude of  capital
inflows that can be supported under national treatment and increases Southern
partner nation welfare. This result implies that as long as the price response
is not too sensitive, the value function of the Southern partner nation is
increasing in its domestic tax rate.
Consequently, under these assumptions, the Southern partner nation would choose
to raise its tax rate, thus depressing the after-tax return. 11  This process
stops when the investment return becomes a binding constraint on capital inflows
and further increases in the tax rate would diminish foreign investment despite
a credible commitment not to expropriate. This would occur when the after-tax
rate of return on investments in the Southern partner nation are equal to the
world rate of interest. Let r represent the opportunity cost of foreign capital
invested in the Southern partner. Investment in the Southern partner then
requires:
(1 + r) £ D(l - t)f' (30)
    If the production function f is moderately concave (or linear), higher tax
rates would lead to lower tax revenue due to the reduction in foreign investment
needed to equalize after-tax returns. Under this assumption, the revenue-
maximizing tax rate for both the Southern partner and non-partner nations is
that which equates the expected rate of return on investments within the country
with the world rate of interest. We assume that  Under the trade accord:
t* = 1 - (l+r)/Df'   (31a)
                           ^              ^
t* = 1- (l+r)/Pf'    (31b)
for the Southern partner and non-partner nations, respectively, while in the
absence of the trade accord:
                           ~                ~~
    t* = 1 - (l +r)/Pf’.     (32a)
                          ^                ^
                          ~              ~ ~
                          t* = 1 - (1+r)/Pf,        (32b)
____________
11Strictly diminishing returns exacerbate this tendency.for the Southern partner and non-partner nations, respectively. Given that the
production function is concave, t* is decreasing in K. t* is also increasing in
the terms of trade faced by the Southern partner nation. Similar results obtain
                ^
    ^   ~       ~
for t*, t*, and t*.
    The optimal tax rates in equations (31) and (32) are computed based on the
equilibrium expectations of the remaining game and then committed, which makes
them given parameters from that point onwards. Since the qualitative results
derived above for exogenous tax rates hold for any arbitrary tax level (within
the assumptions), however, they are robust to the introduction of revenue-
maximizing taxes. In particular, it is still the case by (18) that in
                  ^                         ^
equilibrium K and K are increasing in t and t, respectively. t* is then
determined such that (36) is verified in equilibrium:
                                                                ^
                                                     ^   ~       ~
    t* =t*(K(t*)). Similar results again obtain for t*, t*, and t* .
    Neglecting price effects, the revenue-maximizing tax can be analyzed as
follows: For t£t*, the bindin~ constraint is the risk of noncompliance with
national treatment, and the resulting equilibrium K( t) is the one characterized
in the model.  However, the Southern partner would benefit from a larger tax
rate that would encourage additional foreign investment, as  K'(t)>O. For t>t*,
foreign investment is constrained by low after-tax returns, rather than
expropriation risk. In this region, larger tax rates lead to lower foreign
investment and, under the assumptions, lower tax revenue.
    The only constraint posed by the model which does not generalize to levying
                                                                             ~
optimal taxes is the equality of tax levels with and without the accord,  t*=t*.
Therefore, the implications of the southern partner nation benefiting from the
accord need to be revised. The revised equilibrium and welfare gain conditions
satisfy:
                     ~          ~  ~
    D[bs-(l-b-t )f] = P[bs-(l-b-t*)f] (33)
                 ~    ~ ~  ~
    Ds + t* Df ‡ Ps + t*P f.         (34)
    Substituting the optimal tax conditions (32a) and (32b) into  conditions (33)
                                                           ~ ~
and (34) and combining the two, it is obtained that  f/f'‡f/f’. Under the
maintained assumption that f is linear or moderately concave, this implies that,
           ~  ~
as before, f‡f . The remaining output implications shown in the previous section
are undisturbed.   VII. Conclusion
    The general perception among policymakers is that the most  important
implications of North-South trade accords such as NAFTA are likely to concern
their impact on investment flows. In this paper, we have made an initial effort
to understand the channels through which trade accords can affect North-South
investment flows. Our analysis shows a potential link between trade accords and
investment flows through the impact of the accords on the ability of Southern
partner governments to make commitments concerning treatment of foreign
investment. We show that these accords can affect both the magnitude and the
pattern of inward investment and production, implying the possibility of both
trade and financial diversion stemming from a bilateral regional trade accord.
    While the paper demonstrates that novel effects emerge under sovereign  risk
which must be addressed when assessing the welfare implications of trade
accords, the qualitative policy conclusions from the paper are similar to those
in the old trade-diverting customs union literature (diner 1950): Neglecting the
incentives associated with market power in trade, the greatest gains from
integration are achieved when integration takes place between the countries
which have the greatest potential gains from trade.12 The distinction introduced
in this paper is that these gains now include both current trade and inter-
temporal trade through foreign investment.
    As a result of the bilateral North-South trade accord, output and  foreign
investment in the Southern partner nation increase. Overall Southern output also
grows, but the financial creation in the partner nation may be accompanied by
financial diversion from the rest of the South. While the trade accord obviously
benefits its voluntary parties, it may hurt the rest of the South.
 ___________________
    12The complications stemming from market power in trade are associated with
the degree to which the trade accord precludes agents within the partner nations
from acting in their nations' global interest. For example, by eliminating
tariffs on exports from the Southern partner nation, the trade accord may induce
agents to import larger amounts than are globally desirable for that nation as a
whole. Moreover, this problem would increase with the gains from trade with the
Southern partner nation. However, it should be stressed that this caveat exists
for the traditional customs union literature as well as the current model.APPENDIX
This section will not be able in PDF, however, it is available in hard copy.    References
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